Comparison of Economic Institutions in China and India by unknown
57© The Author(s) 2015
K. Motohashi, Global Business Strategy, Springer Texts in Business 
and Economics, DOI 10.1007/978-4-431-55468-4_4
 4 Comparison of Economic Institutions in China and India 
4.1  Introduction 
 Global business strategies must conform to business environments in target coun-
tries and regions. As repeatedly expressed herein, while the world is becoming fl at-
ter, there still are signifi cant barriers in the form of national borders. Chapter  2 
discussed ideas and strategies to understand the differences in business environ-
ments because of these barriers. According to the CAGE distance framework, the 
differences in business environments due to national borders are wide-ranging and 
consist of cultural, administrative, geographical, and economic factors. These dif-
ferences may be observed in the languages, religions, economic systems, and living 
standards present in each country. This chapter discusses a more fundamental prin-
ciple of “institutional theory” in the context of differing business environments 
between nations, and examines its relationship to global strategy. 
 The 1993 Nobel laureate in economics, Douglas North, developed a theory that 
countries not only have codifi ed “formal” institutions such as laws, but also have 
just as important and implicitly presented “informal” institutions such as the code 
of conduct and practices. North expounded on the relationship of these institutions 
to economic performance (North  1990 ). Among economic theories based on market 
transactions, such as product and labor markets, the fi eld of “institutional econom-
ics” as developed by North, which studies the relationship between economic activi-
ties and informal constraints such as the code of conduct and practices, continues to 
be researched. 
 The behaviors of corporations and individuals within an economic society do not 
necessarily abide by the formal institutions, but they are often determined by infor-
mal restraints such as taboos and customs. This tendency is particularly apparent in 
developing nations such as China and India because these nations have been slow to 
enact various rules regarding economic transactions (corporate law, contract law for 
private transactions, property law including intellectual property, etc.). Even when 
laws have been codifi ed, the enforcement of these rules has often been insuffi cient. 
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For example, China has made three major revisions to its patent laws since their 
enactment in 1985, and intellectual property institutions are being strengthened 
because of calls for “indigenous innovation.” However, the state of intellectual 
property protection in China is far removed from the country’s tough patent system. 
China also implemented antimonopoly laws in 2008. However, its enforcement 
makes it appear like the objective is to protect domestic industry and limit foreign 
corporations. 
 It would appear that these countries are conforming to global standards by inte-
grating modern legal structures from foreign countries and codifying them into 
rules; however, because the inertia of informal rules of economic transaction prac-
tices and societal behaviors is so strong, the enforcement of rules are quite literally 
all over the map. With the help of the WTO and regional economic partnership 
agreements, an international alignment according to formal economic rules is shap-
ing. However, informal rules such as country-specifi c societal norms and customs 
do not change easily, and some doubt the hypothesis of converging into one global 
system. A concept often used within institutional economics is that of “path depen-
dency.” The thinking goes that because practices and rules for economic transac-
tions are formed during a country’s process of achieving economic development—a 
process that is determined by differing historical backgrounds and economic devel-
opments depending on a country—there exists several equilibriums. For example, 
some countries drive cars on the right side of the road, whereas others drive on the 
left. There are various theories as to why this difference exists; one of them is that 
the position of doors in horse-drawn carriages differed in England and France, but 
whatever the case, there is some historical background for this phenomenon. 
However, once a practice like this is set, it is extremely expensive to change and 
things remain in a state with several equilibriums. Incidentally, there is a fi eld of 
study called “comparative (or historical) institutional analysis” that uses game the-
ory to model path dependency and a state of multiple equilibriums to explain differ-
ences in institutions among countries (Aoki  2010 ; Grief  2006 ). 
 Institutions in various countries, including informal institutions, can be charac-
terized as game rules for conducting economic activities. An examination of global 
business strategy cannot be engaged in without an understanding of these game 
rules. In Chap.  2 , we discussed the state of global strategy considering primarily 
codifi ed formal institutions. In this chapter, we progress one step further and con-
sider the impact of institutions in economic society, including unwritten rules, on 
global strategy. Chapter  1 featured a company in an industrial park in Shanghai’s 
Jiading district that was suddenly ordered by the government administration to exit 
the park. Codifi ed rules granted contractual authority to companies within this 
industrial park to use the property for a specifi c length of time. However, the deci-
sion by the government administration can overturn this contract. These rules are 
not explicitly codifi ed, but they nonetheless exist. Property rights in many regions 
of India are vague, and when discussions with local farmers in Tata Motor’s appro-
priation of land in West Bengal did not go well, Tata made the decision to pull out 
of its planned factory construction. 
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 Once events like these occur, they become diffi cult to solve. Thus, it is important 
to increase our understanding of institutions, including their informal rules in coun-
tries, where a corporation is expanding, to understand possible strategies to avoid 
risk, or at least to keep losses from risks to a minimum. In this chapter, we compare 
and contrast China and India as we consider the relationship between economic 
societal institutions and global business. First, we examine foreign investment pol-
icy differences between the two countries. We then explicate institutional differ-
ences that arise because of the differences in each country’s political and economic 
systems. Further, we examine views on global strategy on the basis of the institu-
tional differences in India and China. In doing so, we also explain risk management 
as it applies to global business. 
4.2  Comparative Institutional Analysis of China and India 
4.2.1  Overview 
 The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 as a communist country 
under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. Under the patronage of the then Soviet 
Union, a socialist state was created, but the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 
1966 to 1976, caused great turmoil. With the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, Deng 
Xiaoping took over the country’s leadership, and in 1978, began implementing a 
policy of reform and opening up the nation that started the nation’s economic devel-
opment. Deng Xiaoping’s economic policies enabled economic development by 
attracting foreign corporations, and in the 1990s, China implemented full-scale 
policies to further open the country’s economy. As a result, direct foreign invest-
ment in China skyrocketed, and the number of Japanese companies investing in 
China grew rapidly. Currently, China is known as the “factory of the world,” and 
consumers throughout the world cannot live without Chinese-made products. Since 
the 1990s, China’s economic growth has consistently been at a high level of around 
10 %, and as we have seen in Chap.  1 , the country’s economy has surpassed Japan, 
making China an economic giant second only to the US. 
 On the other hand, the Republic of India gained independence from the British 
Empire in 1947, at which time it was established as a social democracy headed by 
Jawaharlal Nehru, who served as the country’s fi rst prime minister. Each state in India 
has an independent economic system, and taxes and regulations are extraordinarily 
complex. In 1980, the regulations were relaxed to allow partial participation of foreign 
capital, but the impact of that relaxation was very limited compared with China. Because 
of the lack of basic infrastructure such as roads and electricity, India has many handicaps 
as a manufacturing base. Yet, recently, the rapid growth of the IT service industry, pri-
marily in software development and business process outsourcing (BPO), has greatly 
changed India’s image internationally. While China is the “factory of the world,” India 
is the “world’s software developer.” The size of the Indian economy in terms of GDP is 
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still small, at about one-third the size of Japan’s, but recent growth has been remarkable, 
and the country is predicted to be a giant market in the future. 
 Figure  4.1 shows the per capita GDP trends for China and India. The per capita 
GDP was about the same for both countries until 1990, but after that time, China’s 
growth began to outstrip that of India. As of 2010, the per capita GDP was 
USD$4,400 for China versus India’s USD$1,300, showing a huge gap. The source 
of this gap is thought to be the difference in policies for attracting foreign capital. 
 As shown in Fig.  4.2 , direct foreign investment in China has been on an increas-
ing trend since the 1990s. In contrast, for the most part, India had no visible direct 
foreign investment until about 2005, and only began to grow from 2006. Foreign 
investment growth in both countries declined in 2009 because of the fi nancial crisis 
brought on by the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, but the cumulative total invest-
ment to date is still overwhelmingly large in China. Deng Xiaoping, who directed 
policies to open up China to the outside world, visited Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Shanghai, and other southern Chinese cities in 1992, personally witnessing the eco-
nomic development of this economic zone made possible through the allowance of 
foreign investment, and confi rmed the effect of an economic development model 
relying on attracting foreign capital. As a result, in his “southern tour speech,” Deng 
declared his intent to expand the reform that attracted foreign capital—which up to 
that point was restricted to certain regions —all over China. As a result, investments 
in China by foreign fi rms began in earnest. 
 Another turning point for direct investment in China came with their WTO mem-




























 Fig. 4.1  Per capita GDP of China and India ( Source : United Nations Statistics Division data) 
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request of the Chinese government authorities. However, China’s WTO member-
ship sent a message that the Chinese government would create an environment for 
investment that accorded with international rules, thereby reducing investment risks 
for foreign fi rms. In addition, the WTO membership paved way for deregulation 
such as the gradual elimination of foreign capital regulations in service industries 
like fi nance and distribution, which had a tremendous impact on direct investment. 
 The Indian economic policy, on the other hand, still has marked remnants of 
protectionism for domestic industries, and investment risk is still a signifi cant issue 
for foreign fi rms. When India gained its independence in 1947, Prime Minister 
Nehru implemented the concept of planned economy from the then Soviet Union, 
controlling the domestic economic activities through various regulations. These 
regulations were not only for foreign transactions but also for domestic operations, 
and the phrase “License Raj” (“Raj” is a term that means “rule” or “reign,” and was 
used during the period of British colonial rule) became a cynical phrase implying 
that Indian people were ruled by licenses rather than the British. The situation has 
signifi cantly improved since then, but there are still many signifi cant barriers to 
investment, such as labor laws to protect workers, business registrations, and a com-
plex tax code. In addition, manufacturers are impacted by the lack of infrastructure 
such as roads and railways. On the fl ipside, IT services and software, which are not 
as affected by the lack of physical infrastructure, have seen a tremendous amount of 
investment, primarily from European and US fi rms. That said, India created special 
economic zones in 2005, developed industrial parks, and worked to lure foreign 
capital to its manufacturing industries. In addition, the government began relaxing 
foreign investment regulations since the early 2000s, resulting in direct domestic 























































 Fig. 4.2  Inward foreign direct investment of China and India (billions of dollars) ( Source : ADB 
Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacifi c 2011 (August 2011)) 
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 Table 4.1  Major politics and economics events in China and India 
 India  Year  China 
 Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange  1875 
 Independence from British  1947 
 1949  Country was formed 
 1959  15 million deaths due to starvation 
 1966  Start of Cultural Revolution 
 1976  End of Cultural Revolution 
 1978  Liberalization of economy, aggressive 
implementation of direct domestic 
investment 
 1979  Start of “One Child” policy 
 Deregulation policies focused on automotive 
industry 
 1980  Decision to create economic zones in 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shangtou, and 
Xiamen 
 First fi nancial reform 
 Start of the “Contract Responsibility 
System” 
 1981 
 1982  Start of agriculture reforms; 
implementation of “Farmer 
Management Responsibility System” 
 Deregulation of consumer electronics and 
software sectors 
 1984 
 1985  Coastal cities opened to foreign 
investment; creation of economic 
technology development zones 
 1986  Implementation of Management 
Responsibility System to split 
ownership and management of 
state-owned enterprises 
 1989  Tiananmen Square incident 
 1990  Shanghai Stock Exchange open 
 Economic rebuilding and deregulation of 
foreign investment 
 1991 
 Gradual elimination of import licenses and 
lowering of tariff rates 
 Deregulation of foreign investment infl ow 
 Liberalization of foreign exchange  1992  Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour 
Speech; support for economic reforms 
and policies for accelerated economic 
growth 
 Reform of commerce bank system 
 Deregulation of interest rate system  Decision on path toward “socialist 
market economy”  National Stock Exchange established 
 Authorization for foreign investors to trade 
shares of publicly traded Indian companies 
 1993  Start of state-owned enterprise 
privatization 
 Removal of dual exchange rates 
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)
 India  Year  China 
 National Stock Exchange (NSE) open  1994  Second fi nancial reform 
 Implementation of foreign exchange 
system reforms (offi cial RMB 
exchange rate devalued by 50 %, 
move to fl oating exchange rate 
system) 
 International trade surplus 
 WTO Membership  1995  Implementation of Commerce Bank 
Law 
 Complete liberalization of interest rates and 
disposal of bad bank debt 
 1997  Foreign banks to trade RMB 
(restricted to Shanghai’s Pudong 
region) 
 July: Return of Hong Kong 
 September: Full implementation of 
stock system for state-owned 
corporations 
 October: Tariff reductions from 23 
to 17 % on more than 4,800 products 
 Liberalization of foreign stock investment 
regulations 
 1999  March: Acceptance of privately 
owned companies 
 November: Decision to develop 
western China 
 December: Return of Macao 
 Aggressive implementation of direct domestic 
investment 
 2000 
 Acceptance of foreign majority ownerships 
outside of banking insurance, 
telecommunications, and private aviation. 
Most industries allowed 100 % foreign 
ownership 
 2001  March: Beijing wins 2008 Olympics 
bid 
 December: WTO membership 
 2003  Authorization for foreign investors 
to trade shares of publicly traded 
Chinese companies 
 Creation of economic zones  2005 
 100 % foreign investment in real estate 
development allowed 
 Maximum percentage of foreign investment 
in fi nancial and telecommunications industry 
fi rms raised to 74 % 
 Foreign investment approval process greatly 
simplifi ed 
 2006  Start of foreign stock investment 
liberalization 
 Source : Various 
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 Japanese corporate investments into China and India are at USD$66.5 billion and 
USD$13.6 billion, respectively (till end of 2010), and investment in India is 
approaching to roughly one-fi fth of Japan’s investment in China. However, a closer 
examination reveals that Chinese investments cover a breadth of industries ranging 
from manufacturing industries such as automotive and electronics to retail and 
fi nancial services. Indian investment, on the other hand, is primarily in the automo-
tive industry. 
4.2.2  China: State-Led Strategic Foreign Investment Policies 
 Deng’s policies, which began in 1978, opened the country to trade and lifted the ban 
on direct investment from foreign countries. The following year the Joint 
Management Law (the Sino-Foreign Mutual Corporate Investment Law) was 
passed, creating institutional foundations for enticing foreign fi rms through the 
introduction of foreign capital, transfer of technology, and promotion of exports. In 
addition, in 1980, the Chinese government established four economic zones—
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen—to experiment with economic develop-
ment models to attract foreign fi rms. The government developed infrastructure to 
lure foreign fi rms to these zones and implemented preferential policies such as tax 
breaks for these fi rms. In 1984, the country opened 14 coastal cities to foreign 
investment, including Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian, and in 1986, regional restric-
tions on independent investments by foreign fi rms were lifted through the passage 
of the Foreign Enterprise Law. In 1988, almost all coastal regions became a part of 
the coastal economic liberalization zone through the government’s implementation 
of a coastal zone economic development strategy. 
 Market reforms accelerated as a result of Deng’s 1992 southern tour speech, and 
the investment of foreign capital into the country began in earnest. Between 1995 
and 1997, the Chinese government began opening up domestic markets with the 
goal of acquiring WTO membership, and also started liberalizing trade by imple-
menting measures such as reducing tariffs. In the latter half of the 1990s, China 
attracted foreign capital with abundant preferential policies and cheap labor as 
weapons, thereby establishing itself as the “factory of the world.” A plan to develop 
western China kicked off in 1999, and the opening up of China to foreign markets 
moved from coastal regions to the country’s interior. In 2001, China became a mem-
ber of the WTO, and with further loosening of foreign capital restrictions in the 
service industries, China saw a dramatic rise in the amount of direct investment. 
 The methods of capitalization in China include independent foreign capitaliza-
tion (wholly owned fi rms) and joint capitalization in the form of a joint venture with 
a Chinese fi rm. Until the 1990s, direct investment in China was often done at the 
request of local governments, and many of those investments were made as joint 
ventures with local fi rms. However, with China joining the WTO in 2001, the coun-
try gradually eliminated restrictions on foreign capital. This relaxation applied not 
only to the manufacturing industry but also to service industries such as distribution 
and fi nance, with many industries freely able to decide whether to create a wholly 
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owned subsidiary or joint venture. However, it is important to note that industries 
such as the automotive industry, which are viewed as strategically critical by the 
Chinese government, have their own rules. For example, in the automotive industry, 
foreign fi rms are not allowed to establish a wholly owned subsidiary, and are 
restricted to less than 50 % ownership in joint ventures. 
 In the 11th 5-year plan that began in 2006, the Chinese government clarifi ed its 
stance on the selection of investments by foreign fi rms and outlined its goal for 
becoming a “technology nation” with heightened competitiveness of Chinese fi rms. 
In January 2008, the government enacted a labor contract law that improved worker 
compensation, as well as a new corporate income tax law that eliminated preferen-
tial income tax breaks on foreign fi rms. Currently, the Chinese government hopes to 
bring in high-tech companies and environmental fi rms that will contribute to the 
development of the country, rather than simple manufacturers and assemblers that 
have, to date, dominated China’s landscape. Given the reductions in preferential 
policies for foreign capital, the rise in labor costs, and a stronger Chinese currency, 
foreign fi rms are beginning to change their investment strategies in China. Some 
foreign fi rms are examining a setup of bases in nearby countries such as Vietnam to 
distribute their risk, in what is known as a “China Plus One” strategy. 
4.2.3  India: The Steady Progress of a Democratic State 
 Deregulation in India began in 1980 when Indira Gandhi became the prime minister. 
The automotive and electronics sectors were pioneers in this deregulation. Suzuki 
used it as a chance to acquire a leg-up in the market, creating the Maruti Suzuki joint 
venture with the state-owned Maruti Udyog Limited. However, at the start of the 
1980s, economic liberalization policies had not been fully put in place and, other 
than Suzuki in 1982, no other expansion into India’s passenger vehicle market by 
foreign fi rms was allowed. While Toyota, Mazda, Mitsubishi, and Nissan formed 
joint ventures and technological alliances in the commercial vehicle market in India, 
their results were poor and they were forced to exit the market. 
 In addition, deregulation in the 1980s was done in an extremely closed market, 
with extraordinarily strict regulations on trade. The tariffs were high and limits were 
placed on import volumes. All imports of consumer goods were forbidden; imports 
of capital goods, raw materials, and work-in-process goods were sometimes 
allowed, but import licenses were required for any goods that could be manufac-
tured domestically. 
 In the latter half of the 1980s, India fell into budget defi cits and received assis-
tance from the IMF and World Bank. From early 1990s, India worked to rebuild the 
country by implementing new economic policies. The country fi rst improved its 
trade system, aiming to liberalize trade by gradually abolishing import licenses and 
reducing tariffs. Further, authorization for direct foreign investment, while varying 
by industry, was granted automatically to a certain extent, and the time it took to 
obtain authorization shortened. It was in this period that DaimlerChrysler, GM, and 
Ford as well as Japanese automakers’ direct investment in India grew rapidly. At the 
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same time, investors from foreign institutions were allowed to trade shares of public 
companies. 
 However, the Indian government did not begin its full-scale analysis to entice 
foreign capital until after the year 2000. India had a strong aversion to foreign capi-
tal because of its days under the British colonial rule, and the deregulation of for-
eign investment was only gradually accomplished. A major turning point in India on 
foreign capital regulation occurred in 2002 when the Indian government’s 
Department of Commerce changed the theretofore one-off approval system for 
direct investment into a “negative” system. In doing so, industries not on a govern-
ment list were automatically granted investment approval. In addition, industries 
such as electric transmission, fi nancial services, and real estate were deregulated in 
2005. The aggressive investment by foreign fi rms that occurred beginning in 2005 
was because of policy measures that were put in place in India at that time. 
 Further, India enacted an Economic Zone Law in 2005, and as a result, hundreds 
of plans for construction are said to currently exist throughout the country. These 
economic zones have the aim of spurring exports and consist of many wholly owned 
subsidiaries of foreign concerns across a range of industries. The companies in the 
economic zones enjoy preferential treatment under the tax system. However, despite 
having received permission to do so, only a portion of the zones have undertaken 
construction, with many unable to establish construction plans because of local 
resistance. 
4.2.4  Comparison of Political Systems 
 Both China and India began as countries during the latter half of the 1940s, and both 
countries modeled their economic policies on the planned economy of the Soviet 
Union that existed at the time. For different historical reasons, both countries had 
completely closed their doors to the outside world at the time of their independence: 
China due to international political tensions between east and west, and India due to 
its past as a British colony. While they started at similar places economically, the 
two countries’ political systems were completely different. China is, in reality, 
under one party rule of the Communist Party. On the other hand, India chose the 
path of democracy and elects its central and local government leaders by popular 
vote. This difference in political structures leads to very different investment envi-
ronments from the perspective of foreign fi rms. 
 In comparing both countries, Tarun Khanna poses an interesting question, “Why 
can China build cities overnight, yet India can’t build a single road?” (Khanna 
 2007 ). This question captures the essence of institutional differences between China 
and India. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s, China aggressively 
pursued policies to open itself to foreigners. This was carefully done by fi rst exam-
ining the results of experimental policies in certain regions, and then determining it 
to be the path to take for the entire nation. In addition, India dramatically reformed 
its trade system in the 1990s, gradually opening its doors to the outside world. 
However, this was done as a decision to rebuild after running budget defi cits, a 
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decision that was forced upon them because of the fear of impending bankruptcy. In 
democratic India, the leaders of the nation cannot establish policies that went against 
the people’s will. One can easily imagine that because of its history as a British 
colony, the national sentiment was to oppose opening the country to foreigners. In 
these circumstances, a strong motive such as a national crisis was necessary to pro-
mote the path to reform. 
 Let us examine the political systems of China and India in greater detail. The 
legislative body in China is called the National People’s Congress, comprised of 
members from provinces, autonomous prefectures, and directly controlled munici-
palities who are elected by their respective People’s Congresses. People’s Congresses 
are organized for each local government organization below provinces—the cities 
and prefectures—and citizens may only participate in elections at the prefecture 
level and lower. However, many delegates are essentially recommended by local 
organizations of the Chinese Communist Party and are “elected” by the people 
through a vote of confi dence. These delegates themselves elect the National People’s 
Congress members; therefore, it is unlikely that members who are critical of the 
Communist Party will ever be elected. The National People’s Congress not only 
fulfi lls its responsibility as a lawmaking organ but also acts as a supreme authority, 
even in areas of administration, judiciary, and prosecution. The National People’s 
Congress is made up of roughly 3,000 members from across China, even though 
important policy decisions for the country are essentially made by the Communist 
Party’s Central Committee, which had nine members as of September 2012. While 
these nine are ranked, decisions are made by a majority vote. The top ranking mem-
ber is the head of state. Personnel decisions such as the heads of local administrative 
organizations in provinces and directly controlled municipalities are also essentially 
appointed by the Communist Party, making China a state run by one organization: 
the Communist Party. 
 On the other hand, India is a democracy much like Japan. India has many politi-
cal parties, with candidates from each party competing for seats in the national 
parliament (bicameral parliament, consisting of upper and lower houses). It is dif-
fi cult for one party to gain a majority, so coalitions are the norm, with a prime min-
ister selected from among the representatives. In the 2009 general election of the 
Lok Sabha, or lower house, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), India’s largest 
party and a coalition led by the Indian National Congress, became the ruling party. 
The minority coalition is the National Democratic Alliance, with the Bharatiya 
Janata Party, or BJP, at its core. In general, the Indian National Congress takes up 
liberal policies of economic reform, while the BJP favors conservative policies for 
domestic protectionism. However, as a farming nation, the opinions of the country’s 
farmers are important during election time, and domestic policies are always given 
priority over issues of foreign concern. With so many political parties, administer-
ing a government is also diffi cult. Another factor making political decision-making 
in India diffi cult is that state governments, which also hold direct elections, wield 
strong infl uence in the administration of policy. 
 These differences in political structure are well expressed in Khanna’s observa-
tion that “China can build cities overnight, but India cannot build even a single 
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road.” Likewise, these differences are prevalent in the development of foreign 
investment policies implemented since the 1990s. China implemented coherent 
policies with the aim of economic development through enticement of foreign fi rms. 
However, in India, things have not progressed as smoothly. Although India fi nally 
implemented policies favorable to foreign investment in earnest beginning in the 
2000s, economic zone constructions have not moved forward as expected. This is 
because of the political power of landowner famers and the time taken to appropri-
ate land. As the line “India cannot build even a single road” suggests, improvements 
on roads and railway infrastructures, in addition to the industrial parks, are not pro-
gressing as planned, instead becoming a barrier to attracting foreign investment. 
4.2.5  Comparison of Economic Systems 
 From the perspective of political structure, China is proceeding more smoothly in 
implementing policies for foreign investment and economic development. However, 
from the perspective of economic systems, particularly corporate activities and mar-
ket mechanisms, India is superior. In his book, Tarun Khanna asked the question, 
“Why can large companies be created in China, with only a handful of them being 
competitive internationally?” India has companies such as Infosys that is hailed in 
the book “The World Is Flat,” and Tata Motors, a well-known manufacturer of pas-
senger vehicles. In addition, Mittal, India’s steel manufacturer, merged with 
Europe’s Arcelor to become the world’s largest steel company. 
 China’s Communist Party created an economic system in which, pursuant to the 
construction of a socialist state, the state owns all assets and distributes these assets 
to the citizenry. Formerly, China had privately owned companies similar to the Tata 
Group, but they escaped to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other locales when the People’s 
Republic of China was established. With the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping 
starting in 1978, the country began integrating competition via market mechanisms 
into the domestic planned economy. The country did away with the system of wealth 
distribution through state-owned corporations that followed planned production 
activities, as well as price controls, implementing a system of free trade of goods in 
product markets. The reforms for state-owned corporations were put in place and 
many companies moved to become joint stock entities with limited shareholders or 
limited liability corporations. Figure  4.3 lists the changes in share of total value 
added by form of ownership among Chinese manufacturers (20,000–40,000 
medium- and large-sized fi rms). The state-owned corporations commanded over 
70 % share in 1995, but decreased to roughly 20 % in 2011. On the other hand, 
limited liability corporations (or joint stock companies) had the greatest share 
increase. The greatest change occurred in the period from the latter half of the 1990s 
to the fi rst half of the 2000s because of the reforms for state-owned companies that 
were put in place from 1998 to 2000 by then prime minister, Zhu Rongji. The aim 
of those reforms was to “grab the large and free the small,” i.e., the state would 
directly control large fi rms, whereas small fi rms would be converted to joint stock 
entities and its corporate activities liberalized. The State-Owned Assets Supervision 
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and Administration Commission (SASAC) was created in 2003 to keep manage-
ment of all state-owned enterprises in one place. However, companies that had been 
converted to joint stock fi rms often had the government or government personnel as 
major shareholders, so a large portion of the Chinese economy was still essentially 
under the control of national or local governments. 
 Until it was revised to allow for individual ownership of assets in 1999, making 
possible the creation of fully private fi rms, private companies were forbidden under 
the Chinese Constitution. It was possible to manage private businesses as entities 
called “individual companies,” but revisions to laws allowed for purely private man-
agement of fi rms as companies. However, while the number of private companies in 
China is large, most are small businesses because everything in the business world 
in China happens with government involvement. For example, when funding from 
fi nancial institutions becomes necessary for a new venture, banks will prioritize 
funding to private corporations backed by the government for its perceived low risk. 
Under competitive circumstances, there should be banks that will take risks and 
invest in powerful private fi rms. However, most large banks are state-owned, with 
once again bringing the overall industry under the strict control of the state. Huawei 
Technologies is one of the few private Chinese companies that is internationally 
competitive. Founded in 1988 as a wholesaler of telecommunications equipment 
manufactured overseas, Huawei has become a truly global vendor with half of its 
 Fig. 4.3  Share of value added by type of ownership among Chinese manufacturers ( Source : 
Estimates compiled from China National Bureau of Statistics data) 
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revenues from switches, cell phones, and other telecom equipment sold outside 
China. However, even Huawei had diffi culty raising capital when it was starting out. 
 The importance of government relations is not limited to raising capital. As 
observed in Fig.  4.3 , state-related businesses account for a great share of the Chinese 
economy. Accordingly, the counterparties to the private companies that operate in 
China are state-related businesses. In a B2C business model, sales channels are 
necessary to deliver a company’s products to consumers. Because deregulation in 
the distribution market, whether wholesale or retail, has been delayed, companies 
are forced to do business with companies having some connection with the govern-
ment. Thus, the bureaucracy in China—and in its background, the Communist 
Party—has spread its net wide across economic activities, making it impossible to 
do business without touching its network. 
 However, India has an economy primarily driven by private companies. The core 
companies among these are multifaceted group companies such as the Tata, 
Reliance, and Birla Group. For example, the Tata Group began as a textile mill in 
Bombay (today’s Mumbai) in 1870, and continued to grow its operations after 
Indian independence. Among its group companies are Tata Motors, the third largest 
passenger vehicle maker in India, and Tata Consultancy Service (TCS), India’s larg-
est IT services fi rm. Other group companies span a broad array of industries includ-
ing power, steel, and wireless services. There are companies like Infosys, which 
started in 1981 with the equivalent of 30,000 yen in capital, and has grown to 
become one of the few world-class IT service company today that threatens the 
dominance of IBM. Unlike China, the Indian government was historically seen as 
something that got in the way of private business. Since the economic reforms of 
1991, government organizations are said to have become more supportive of busi-
ness activities (Capelli et al.  2011 ), although the situation is completely different 
from China, where government organizations are the primary drivers of business. 
 The greatest structural difference in Chinese and Indian companies is that those 
in China are built through their various relationships with government, whereas 
those in India are private companies that compete in the midst of market mecha-
nisms. Of course, the maturity of product and fi nancial markets in India is nowhere 
near that of developed countries. The remnants from the era under the “License Raj” 
regulatory scheme, when activities were heavily bound, still exist in the complex 
systems for establishing and ending companies, taxes, and labor. In wholesale or 
other distribution industries, India has stricter regulations than even China and its 
infrastructure lags. Many government regulations mean that opportunities also 
increase for civil servants to exercise discretion at the local level, which is one rea-
son briberies given to civil servants are rampant. However, the situation is quite 
different from China, where governmental decision-making at the national and local 
levels impacts every aspect of business. 
 The differences between these two countries are evident in the way risk is man-
aged in running the national economy. In India, manufacturers, distributors, banks, 
and various other companies each assess risk and reward under the mechanism of a 
market economy, and then engage in business activities. Further, codifi ed rules such 
as corporate and labor laws as well as fi nancial market regulations are created with 
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the intent to complement market mechanisms. The companies are able to engage in 
business, assuming that their counterparties and funding partners are going to act in 
accordance with the weighted risks and rewards. Trust in these market mechanisms 
exists as a code of conduct in Indian business. 
 In China, business owners do not take on all the risk themselves, rather the 
government shoulders a portion of that risk. In return, the state demands that the 
business act in alignment with bureaucratic objectives. The Communist Party man-
ages the state, and advancement in the party hierarchy is said to be determined in 
provincial and municipal level “tournament games,” where economic growths at one 
local government is pitted against another (Xu  2011 ). This system led to local gov-
ernments battling over one another to attract foreign fi rms, and as a result, it enabled 
China to maintain high economic growth rate to date on the basis of liberal policies. 
The policies themselves are not decided at the central government level, which simply 
sets a certain direction and leaves the rest to the discretion of heads of local govern-
ments, so that they might compete more effectively. As such, it is imperative for com-
panies to surmise the views of the local government when doing business in China. 
 Although China is implementing reforms such as state-owned enterprise reforms 
and the creation of corporate law to move toward a market-based economy utilizing 
market mechanisms, the behavior of economic entities in the country follows the 
informal rules of a socialist state. As a result, capital and fi nancial markets continue 
to be immature, making it diffi cult for companies that are internationally competi-
tive to be formed. The 11th 5-year plan that began in 2006 has the creation of 
“indigenous innovation” as its key objective, which aims for new inventions that are 
internationally competitive to be home-grown, rather than be produced by import-
ing technologies from the West or Japan as was done in the past. Local governments 
must now implement specifi c policies based on this vague goal. However, innova-
tion is only a possibility through constant competition and ingenuity of individual 
companies. Thus, it will be diffi cult to obtain this goal if corporate managements 
run their organizations while gauging the local government’s mood and reaction as 
they have done so far. Therefore, there are few companies in China that can compete 
internationally, even though the country has large state-owned corporations. 
4.3  Global Strategy Implications 
4.3.1  Institutional Voids 
 The diffi culty of managing a global business in emerging countries arises because 
the local institutions in their respective economic systems are very different from 
those of the developed nations. As discussed in the previous section, China and 
India have great differences in their institutions. We stated that Indian institutions 
are built on the foundation of market mechanisms, but that the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms in the country is not even close to that of developed nations. On the 
other hand, China’s economic system is unique with the government’s direct 
involvement in every aspect of economic activity; however, it has more effi cient 
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markets than those in India, such as the product and labor markets. The institutional 
differences by country strongly correlate to the level of effi ciencies in diverse mar-
kets such as product, capital, and labor markets. We term nonfunctioning market 
mechanisms as “institutional voids,” and introduce a methodology for analyzing 
global strategies on the basis of this term. 
 “Institutional voids” are economic institutions such as product, capital, or labor 
markets that have matured in developed nations, but have not reached a suffi cient 
level of maturity in emerging markets, thus creating a void (Khanna and Palpu 
 2010 ). These researchers defi ne the difference between emerging and developing 
countries by the degree of void. The emerging countries are countries like India and 
China that have immature economic institutions compared with developed nations, 
but have somewhat of an institutional foundation, thereby limiting the size of the 
void. On the other hand, developing countries are countries that do not have an 
institutional base, where the institutional void is so excessively large that companies 
accustomed to operating in developed nations with no institutional voids must use 
completely different business models to succeed there. 
 We use the above defi nition in our discussion of “emerging countries,” but must 
provide clarity into certain institutional voids. We have created four classifi cations 
of voids:
 1.  Voids in product markets 
 2.  Voids in capital markets 
 3.  Voids in labor markets 
 4.  Macroenvironments related to institutions 
 First, we discuss the voids in product markets, which are determined by the fol-
lowing two factors: the extent products and services can be purchased by consumers 
on the basis of correct information, and whether market thickness can be secured 
with suffi ciently functioning competitive markets containing many buyers and sell-
ers. Thus, the effi ciency of sales channels of wholesalers and retailers as well as the 
state of logistics and infrastructures are related to this type of void. When compar-
ing China and India on these points, China might be said to have relatively smaller 
voids (i.e., more effi cient). The restrictions on foreign capital in the distribution 
industry have been signifi cantly relaxed in China, resulting in companies such as 
Carrefour and Walmart entering the Chinese market. However, India still has strict 
regulations on that industry. China also has more advanced infrastructure, making 
logistics more effi cient. 
 In the case of voids in capital markets, India has smaller voids, thus more effi -
cient markets. As noted above with regard to bank lending, in China, government 
organizations exert heavy-handed control over lending by fi nancial institutions. In 
stock markets, China’s publicly traded corporations have only a portion of their 
shares available to the market and often more than half are owned by government- 
related entities (i.e., nonpublic enterprises). As a result, the true state of a publicly 
traded company is unclear based on the available fi nancial information, making 
information asymmetry between companies and investors a big concern. On the 
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other hand, India has had bank fi nancing and stock trading since its colonial era, and 
as such, issues like the ones observed in China are relatively small. 
 Third, we discuss the voids in labor markets. This type of void is determined by 
how effi ciently labor demand (corporations) is matched with supply (i.e., workers). 
On this point, the void in China is relatively smaller. India has extremely strict labor 
regulations, and it is practically impossible for corporations of a certain size to sack 
employees. In addition, unions are very active and there are many selection biases 
when hiring employees. Differences in language depending on the region and lack 
of women entering the workforce also negatively affect labor market effi ciency. 
China has relatively higher worker mobility, and while there are heightened sense of 
worker entitlement and stronger regulations protecting workers, these issues are 
small in comparison with India. 
 Finally, macro environments relating to institutions encompass many areas 
including foreign capital regulations, broadcasting regulations, and regulations on 
the activities of foreign fi rms. We briefl y discuss Chinese media regulations. The 
content of newspapers, magazines, and other forms of media in the country are 
checked stringently. It is possible now for individuals to publish their own informa-
tion on the Internet in the form of blogs or similar formats, but cyber-cops keep a 
close watch on Internet discussions, and objectionable opinions are censored on a 
daily basis. However, these information regulations apply to politically sensitive 
content, so economic information such as corporate fi nancials and product informa-
tion is not impacted as much, making the impact of this factor on China’s institu-
tional voids minimal. 
 Having listed these voids, the global strategy based on Khanna’s “institutional 
voids” is to select one of the following, depending on the circumstances: (1) repli-
cating domestic business or (2) adapting to the local environment. This is similar to 
the discussion of “aggregate” and “adapt” in the AAA framework discussed in 
Chap.  2 . The former should be selected to achieve economies of scale or to leverage 
a global brand; the latter should be selected when voids are too large and a strategy 
of replication is unrealistic. 
 In addition, we have discussed the model of using voids as business opportunities 
(the model that could be called “arbitration” in the AAA framework). As an exam-
ple of this, the German retail fi rm Metro Group has a cash-wholesale business in 
India called “Metro Cash and Carry,” which provides a wealth of clues as to how to 
accomplish the goal of this model. Metro Group’s business exploits India’s institu-
tional void of an ineffi cient distribution system. The business was started as a cash 
and carry service in Bangalore in 2003, and has since expanded throughout India. 
However, India has regulations on the trade of agricultural products (trade on these 
products within India must be conducted in government-authorized markets called 
“mandis”), making it impossible for Metro Group to deal in agricultural products. 
This law was created during the 1950s to protect farmers, but is currently an impedi-
ment to improving agricultural distribution. Agricultural products in India must be 
fresh, but a large amount of product goes waste during distribution, and even the 
government acknowledges the need to revise the law. At present, movements are 
afoot in some states to do so, but they have met with opposition in multiple states, 
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especially from masses of individual businessmen who buy and sell under the sys-
tem of mandis. Metro Group is working hard in appealing to both farmers and con-
sumers that eliminating the law will be benefi cial for both. When institutional voids 
become business opportunities, local systems are established in response to such 
voids; however, these local systems can also become large barriers. Businesses must 
assess the viability of conducting business by understanding these types of risks, 
and must be prepared to make long-term investments for the success of that 
business. 
 In addition, businesses have strategically important options of whether to tackle 
institutional voids alone or jointly with a local business. As deduced from the Metro 
Group example, businesses do not necessarily need to embrace voids; rather, it can 
be effective to work with local fi rms in making a long-term investment to reduce 
local voids. Other companies have entered the cash and carry business in India, for 
example, Tesco in the UK announced its intentions of partnering with the Tata 
Group to join the market. From the perspective of foreign fi rms, China and India are 
full of institutional defects, but companies are doing business within the confi nes of 
these local institutions. If a company recognizes a defect it believes will be diffi cult 
to overcome independently, there is value in considering a partnership with a local 
fi rm before conceding defeat entirely. 
4.3.2  Importance of Informal Institutions 
 Compared with advanced nations in which market mechanisms function effectively, 
“institutional voids” concept begins by clarifying the institutional problems that 
beset emerging nations. Accordingly, the institutional market is an important topic 
studied within institutional economics, though these studies only incorporate a por-
tion of the framework and does not incorporate informal institutions such as social 
codes of conduct and practices. Refl ecting back on our comparison of the overall 
economic institutions including informal institutions in China and India, let us now 
consider their implications in terms of global strategy. 
 First, we must emphasize the necessity of strengthening our understanding of 
institutions, including informal rules such as codes of conduct and practices in cor-
porate economic activities, in addition to explicit rules such as economic laws that 
are part of economic institutions in target countries. In particular, informal rules are 
structured over time in the process of economic development, and refl ect the histori-
cal background and political systems of that country. Thus, they are a critical factor 
underlying economic activities. In this regard, the desire of the government is 
clearly refl ected in various aspects of corporate economic transactions in China. In 
contrast, market competition among private companies drives the rules of the game 
in India. However, in our discussion of “institutional voids,” India is fragmented by 
complex regulatory systems and markets from the aspect of market mechanism effi -
ciency, and it indicated how far away these are from the level of advanced nations. 
In both China and India, reforms are underway for the creation of corporate law and 
regulatory systems, and both countries are working on economic systems based on 
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global standards in accordance with the WTO rules. However, even if codifi ed laws 
and guidelines change, actual economic activity will not change very easily because 
of entrenched informal codes of conduct. Thus, the likelihood of failure will increase 
if a company bases its business decisions only on codifi ed rules. 
 Next, the relationship with the government is particularly important for busi-
nesses in emerging markets. China has a unique economy in which political pro-
cesses that determine national leadership take place in the Communist Party, and 
economic development objectives are achieved through a system of “elimination 
tournaments” at the local government level. However, a common fact among emerg-
ing markets is that local government policies and decision-making have a signifi -
cant impact on global business. India has many institutional voids, but industrial 
policies such as government regulations and regional revitalization rules are making 
actual economic activities possible by fi lling market mechanism voids. In emerging 
nations with slow development of the private sector, government is often the partner 
of businesses. For example, in the next chapter, we examine infrastructure busi-
nesses such as railways and water; in these businesses, even though the end con-
sumer is the general public, the government acts as an intermediary as a B2G2C 
business. As such, it is important to maintain good relationships with government 
organizations and build business models that can accomplish a win-win relation-
ship. In addition to revitalizing regional economies, local governments enforce poli-
cies with various goals such as providing stable living environments for citizens and 
improving the environment. It is important to consider business strategies that not 
only generate profi tability but also contribute to these government objectives, or in 
other words, contribute to the value proposition for the government. Finally, let us 
discuss risk management as it relates to global strategy for emerging nations posing 
high levels of uncertainty. Investment decisions for a global business must consider 
various risks such as local macroeconomic environments, exchange rates, and other 
economic risks; labor relations, procured parts quality, and other operational risks; 
and societal risks such as opposition to foreign fi rms. It is possible to deal with 
economic risks to a certain extent using fi nancial instruments such as futures trading 
and options. Most operational risks are caused by institutional voids, and JETRO 
and others have published examples of how best to deal with them (JETRO  2006 ). 
It is possible to forecast these risks to a certain extent, and few have great impact as 
to cause a cessation of business operations. The most important risk to consider 
under the global business strategy are risks of policy changes, as we have observed 
in the sudden order for a company to leave the industrial park in Shanghai’s Jiading 
district. The risk of political instability such as a coup de’état is also great, but 
unlikely in our emerging nation subjects of China and India (unlike developing 
nations with huge institutional voids). Election results in India can impact policy 
direction, and it can be characterized as a policy risk in the broad sense of the term. 
 So how should companies react in the face of policy risk? These risks exist 
because of sudden changes in government policy and the breadth of discretion given 
to governments in the administration of policy. Thus, understanding the direction 
and breadth of these changes is, in effect, risk management, specifi cally, it is to 
recognize the policy objectives and priorities of the national and local governments. 
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In China, central and local governments publicize policy decisions made at the vari-
ous levels. In India, policies change depending on election results at the national 
and state levels. Gathering and analyzing this kind of intelligence is a necessity. Of 
the two countries, China carries higher risks because policy making is done by a 
select number of central and local leaders. On the other hand, it is easier to ascertain 
the general direction of the country in case of India because issues are visible in 
election results. However, in either case, building win-win relationships with local 
governments is critical, as already discussed. Local corporate social responsibility, 
or CSR, activities are effective responses to societal risks such as opposition to for-
eign fi rms in India and anti-Japanese sentiments in China. In any case, companies 
must realize the necessity for long-term investments in the countries in which they 
conduct business. 
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